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Abstract—One of the most common types of Physical Unclon-
able Functions (PUFs) is the ring oscillator PUF (RO-PUF), in
which the output bits are obtained by comparing the oscillation
frequencies of different ring oscillators. In this paper we design
a new type of ring oscillator PUF in which the different inverters
composing the ring oscillators can be supplied by different
voltages. The new RO-PUF can be used to (1) increase the
maximum number of possible challenge/response pairs produced
by the PUF; (2) generate a high number of bits while consuming
a low area; (3) improve the reliability of the PUF in case of
temperature variations. We present the basic idea of the new
RO-PUF and then discuss its applications.
I. INTRODUCTION
Most secure cryptographic algorithms use a private secret
value, defined as key, to encrypt and decrypt data. The key
is normally stored in a RAM or a non-volatile memory.
Being dependent to a unique value stored in memory makes
algorithms vulnerable to various attacks such as invasive and
semi-invasive attacks like physical tampering [1]–[3], whose
goal is to obtain access to the key. Protecting the stored key
against these attacks is vital for guaranteeing the security of
the cryptographic devices.
As suggested in [2], possible techniques used during man-
ufacturing, such as using fuse memory arrays and planarising
each predecessor layer before applying the next layer, can
partially protect the storage elements against these attacks.
However, the attackers are constantly looking for new attack
methods. There is a non-stop ongoing battle between the
designers who are trying to improve the security of their
products and the attackers who are constantly trying to break
them [2].
Physical Unclonable Functions (PUFs) were introduced in
2002 [4] by B. Gassend and co-workers. PUFs use the physical
structure of each device to generate a set of unique data which
resembles the chip fingerprint. Even if identical PUFs are
implemented in different chips using the same manufacturing
process, small device-to-device variations result in each PUF
generating a different set of data, which is in principle unique
and impossible to duplicate for all chips. PUFs are sensitive
to device variations; any invasive or semi-invasive attack will,
with a high probability, cause a permanent alteration of the
device physical properties and thus alter permanently the be-
haviour of the PUF, rendering the device unusable. Therefore,
it is believed that Physical Unclonable Functions provide high
security for hardware devices. Two main usages of PUFs in
crypto-systems are embodying a single cryptographic key and
implementing a challenge-response authentication method.
Ring Oscillator PUFs (RO-PUF) were introduced in
2007 [5] and exploit the differences between the delay char-
acteristics of wires and transistors. The output bits of a RO-
PUF are determined by comparing the oscillation frequencies
of ring oscillators. RO-PUFs have a high reliability and are
easier to implement compared to previously proposed designs
such as butterfly PUFs [6]. Since 2007, many researches
were conducted on RO-PUFs. In [7] and [8], a possible
implementation of a RO-PUF on an FPGA was suggested.
[9] and [10] introduced methods to increase the reliability in
case of temperature variations; other works aimed at making
the hardware more secure [11].
In this work we suggest a new design for RO-PUFs, which
is based on the idea to use independent supply voltages for the
different inverters composing all ring oscillators. Our method
can be used for:
• Improving authentication by increasing the maximum
number of possible challenge/response pairs produced by
a RO-PUF.
• Designing low-area RO-PUFs for applications with strong
area limitations
• Improving the RO-PUF reliability by decreasing its sen-
sitivity to temperature variations
All three applications are analysed in detail, comparing the
results we obtain with state-of-art solutions that can be found
in literature.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: in
Section II, an overview of RO-PUFs is given; in Section III
we discuss the dependency of ring oscillator frequencies to
supply voltage variations; in Section IV we introduce the
basic idea of our new RO-PUF; in Section V we calculate
the uniqueness of our RO-PUF; in Section VI we study how
our RO-PUF can be used to implement an efficient challenge-
response authentication method; in Section VII we estimate
the area savings that can be obtained using our RO-PUF; in
Section VIII we suggest how our RO-PUF can be used to
increase reliability in presence of temperature variations; in
Section IX we conclude the paper and discuss future works.
II. RING OSCILLATOR PUFS
Ring Oscillator PUFs (RO-PUFs), as designed in [5], have a
simple architecture made of two n-bit multiplexer, 2 counters,
1 comparator and n ring oscillators (ROs) (see Figure 1).
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Each ring oscillator contains an odd number of inverters
connected in a loop; each ring oscillates with a unique
frequency depending on the characteristics of each of its
inverters, which variate unpredictably from cell to cell due
to manufacturing variations, even within the same chip, and
are impossible to imitate. If the frequencies at which the ring
oscillators oscillate are too high, the counters may not be able
to count oscillations; therefore, there is a minimal number of
inverters in every ring oscillator necessary to ensure a suitable
oscillating frequency. This value depends on the technology
but is typically in the order of 10 - 20 inverters.
The two multiplexers select two ROs which are compared
together (pair). The two counter blocks count the number of
oscillations of each of the two ROs in a fixed time interval
(comparison time). At the end of the interval, the outputs of
the two counters are compared together. Depending on which
of the two counters has the highest value, the output of the
PUF is set to 0 or 1. The output of the PUF is set to 0 if the
first ring oscillator in the pair is faster than the second (the
value of the first counter is higher than that of the second),
and to 1 if it is slower (the value of the first counter is lower
than that of the second). If the two frequencies are very close
to each other, the output of the PUF may variate unpredictably
from run to run. It is however possible to improve the accuracy
of the PUF by using larger counters and longer comparison
time intervals.
Originally, a RO-PUF produces 1-bit output for each com-
parison time interval. In each comparison time interval, the
multiplexer selector is changed, the pair is changed and the
RO-PUF produces another bit. A RO-PUF can be modified
to produce multiple bits of data per comparison interval by
increasing the number of multiplexers, counters and compara-
tors, and comparing several pairs of ring oscillators at the same
time.
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Fig. 1. A RO-PUF circuit implemented as in [5]
III. VOLTAGE SUPPLY DEPENDENCY
All electronic components are sensitive to variations of
their operating conditions. Supply voltage variations in CMOS
systems affect the delay d of a combinational path of digital
cells: if the supply voltage raises, the delay decreases and vice-
versa. The relation between the delay d and the supply voltage
V of the path is a complex relation which can be measured
experimentally or estimated at SPICE level. A simplified,
approximate model for this relation is given by the Alpha law
[12]:
d = K
V
(V − Vth)α dM (1)
Where K = (VM−Vth)
α
VM
is a scaling factor; Vth is the
threshold voltage of the transistors, α is the velocity saturation
index of the technology and dM is the delay of the path when
supplied with the typical supply voltage VM of the technology.
In UMC 90 nm ASIC technology, Vth = 0.6V , α = 1.54
and K = 0.379 were estimated by simulating at SPICE level
a chain of 10 inverters under different supply voltages. In
principle the Alpha law is valid for all combinational paths
in a given technology and the only parameter that changes
from path to path is the scaling factor dM .
IV. MULTI-VOLTAGE RO-PUF
Our idea is to exploit the delay-to-supply voltage depen-
dency from formula 1 to transform an original RO-PUF into a
new RO-PUF characterized by smaller design, higher number
of bits and higher resistance to temperature variations.
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Fig. 2. Multi-voltage RO-PUF
The basic scheme of our RO-PUF is shown in Figure 2.
In all ring oscillators, the inverters are grouped in C dif-
ferent columns with roughly the same number of inverters.
Inverters belonging to the same column always share the
same supply voltage. The supply voltage of each column
of inverters can be selected among L different values (In
Figure 2 L = 3) indicated as V dd1, V dd2, ..., V ddL and
can be selected independently from the supply voltage of
the other columns using PMOS switches. The columns can
contain a single inverter per ring or multiple inverters grouped
together. The supply voltages V dd1, ..., V ddL are selected
within the technology range allowing direct communication
between gates without requiring level shifters, so that inverters
can communicate with each other safely. The multiplexers,
the counters and the comparators operate always on typical
supply voltage. Buffers (two inverters in series operating under
typical voltage supply) are introduced at the output of every
ring oscillator to guarantee fast signal transitions at the input
of the multiplexers.
The oscillation frequency of each RO depends on the delay
of all the inverters composing it. As an example, let us consider
the UMC 90 nm PUF in Figure 3, where two ring oscillators
indicated as ROA and ROB are being compared. Both ring
oscillators are composed of 3 inverters, with C = 3 and L = 3
(small ring oscillators are chosen to keep the presentation
simple, but note that these ring oscillators are too fast to
be used in a real PUF). For the case in which all column
supply voltages are equal to the typical supply voltage of the
technology V dd2 = 1.2V , the relation between the delays of
the inverters di and the total delay dRO of the ROs (the inverse
of their oscillating frequency) can be defined as:
di1A + di2A + di3A = dROA
di1B + di2B + di3B = dROB (2)
In general, di1, di2 and di3 are not equal and depend on
unpredictable and uncontrollable device variations between
the different inverters composing each ring oscillator. As an
example, we suppose to have:
3di1A = 2di2A = 6di3A
4di1B = 4di2B = di3B (3)
Combining relations 2 and 3, the components of dRO are
given by:
2
6
dROA +
3
6
dROA +
1
6
dROA = dROA
1
6
dROB +
1
6
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4
6
dROB = dROB
As discussed in Section III, the supply voltage variation
of each electronic component directly affects its delay based
on relation 1. If the supply voltage of the first inverter in
both ring oscillators is raised from 1.2V to 1.32V , the relation
predicts that its delay will decrease by a factor ∼ 0.83. Based
on formula 1, the delays of the ring oscillators d∗RO under the
new configuration convert to:
d∗ROA = 0.83
2
6
dROA +
3
6
dROA +
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dROA = 0.94dROA
d∗ROB = 0.83
1
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1
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4
6
dROB = 0.97dROB
Due to the increase in the speed of the first inverter in
both ROs, the new oscillating frequencies f∗ROA =
1
d∗ROA
and f∗ROB =
1
d∗ROB
are higher than the nominal frequencies
fROA =
1
dROA
and fROB = 1dROB . However, since f
∗
ROA =
fROA
0.94 and f
∗
ROB =
fROB
0.97 , there is no guarantee that these
frequencies hold the same relation as they did under nominal
supply voltage. In other words, if ROA was slower than ROB
under nominal supply voltages, there is a possibility that ROA
is faster than ROB with the new supply voltage configuration.
In our RO-PUF, instead of a single bit output, by changing
the supply voltages of the different columns, each pair of ring
oscillators can produce a set of different output bits. For each
pair, the maximum number of bits which can be produced
with C columns and L supply voltages is equal to LC . As an
example, for a RO-PUF with L = 3 and C = 3, the number
of bits that can be generated by one pair of ring oscillators is
33 = 27.
We generated using SPICE two random 3-inverter ring
oscillators in UMC 90 nm technology with C = 3 and L = 3
(V dd1 = 1.08V ;V dd2 = 1.2V ;V dd3 = 1.32V ), setting
the characteristics of each device randomly depending on the
typical manufacturing intra-chip tolerances of the technology.
We then set the supply voltages of every column to all possible
LC = 27 configurations. The relation between the delays of
ROA and ROB (dROA − dROB) for all these configurations
is shown in Figure 4. Among all the configurations, 12 result
in the first RO being faster than the second, and the other 15
result in the second RO being faster than the first.
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Fig. 3. A pair of three-inverter ring oscillators with C = 3 and L = 3.
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Fig. 4. Values of dROA − dROB for all 27 voltage configurations for the
RO pair in Figure 3. dROA and dROB indicate respectively the delays of
ROA and ROB . If ROA is faster than ROB , dROA − dROB is negative,
else it is positive.
This increase in output bits cannot be obtained by control-
ling the supply voltage of the entire PUF instead of controlling
independently the supply voltage of each inverter column. In
fact, if the supply voltage of a whole PUF is changed, then
both ring oscillators composing any pair will work at a higher
or lower supply voltage. Based on the Alpha law no variation
in the output bit of the PUF should occur, because both ring
oscillators in the pair operate faster or slower with ideally
matched variations.
Continuing with the same example RO-PUF from Figure 3
and defined by equations 2 and 3, if all gates work with the
highest supply voltage V dd3 = 1.32V , the delays of the ring
oscillators d+RO under the new configuration convert to:
d+ROA = 0.83
2
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4
6
dROB = 0.83dROB
Since the variations have the same effect on all six inverters,
they have the same effect on the delays on the ring oscillators
and the RO-PUF output bit does not change. Experimental
results reported in [5] are consistent with this analysis and
show that by changing the supply voltage of a RO-PUF by
10% from the typical voltage, only 0.48% of the bits flip their
value. The bits that flip are explained by higher order effects
which are not considered in the Alpha law and which affect
mainly pairs of ring oscillators that run at closely matched
frequencies.
Our solution constrains all inverters in the same column to
always be supplied by the same supply voltage. The idea of a
RO-PUF is to compare the oscillating frequencies of ring oscil-
lators that are nominally identical, and without this constraint
this would not be the case. An attacker having gained access to
the supply voltage configuration of a chip through an invasive
or semi-invasive attack can gain knowledge on the structure of
the PUF and thus guess the most probable output bit values.
Also, the attacker could modify the supply voltages so that
one of the output bits is changed in a predictable fashion.
Compared to the original RO-PUF, we support multiple
supply voltages in our design. Our design should be reliable in
case of voltage variations in all the supply levels. To guarantee
that the system operates reliably, is that the voltage distance
between each two supply levels should satisfy the relation:
MAX(|V ddi − V ddj |) > MAX(V ARi + V ARj)
2
(1 < i, j ≤ L) (4)
where V ARi and V ARj are defined respectively as the
maximum variations of V ddi and V ddj (see Figure 5).
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Fig. 5. Voltage levels contraints
V. UNIQUENESS
Inter-chip uniqueness is a parameter typically used to eval-
uate PUFs. The inter-chip uniqueness of a PUF is calculated
by checking how different and random are the output bits of
two identical PUFs implemented in different chips.
As discussed in [13], the uniqueness U for an original RO-
PUF can be calculated by considering a set of k identical PUFs
implemented in different chips. The uniqueness is defined as
the average Hamming Distance between n bit outputs obtained
from any possible pair of two PUFs i and j, expressed in
percentage:
U =
(
k
2
)−1 i=k−1∑
i=1
j=k∑
j=i+1
HD (Oi(n), Oj(n))
n
× 100%
=
2
k × (k − 1)
i=k−1∑
i=1
j=k∑
j=i+1
HD (Oi(n), Oj(n))
n
× 100%
where HD (Oi(n), Oj(n)) is the Hamming Distance be-
tween two series of n-bit outputs (Oi(n) and Oj(n)) obtained
by setting the multiplexers of the two PUFs to n different val-
ues (identical for PUFs i and j) during n different comparison
intervals.
With our RO-PUF, the output bits of a PUF depend not only
on which ring oscillators are selected by the multiplexers but
also on the supply voltage configuration. The uniqueness is
estimated with the same formula as for the original RO-PUF,
but each of the n output bits is obtained by setting the multi-
plexers and the voltage supplies to n different configurations
(identical for PUFs i and j) during n different comparison
intervals.
We designed k = 20 RO-PUFs in UMC 90 nm technology,
each containing only two ring oscillators composed of 13
inverters, with C = 3 and L = 2. The RO-PUFs are all nom-
inally identical, but all devices where generated with random
characteristic mismatches based on the typical manufacturing
tolerances of the technology. Through SPICE simulation, with
n = LC = 8 we found U = 51.35%, which is close to the
ideal result 50%.
VI. AUTHENTICATION
As discussed in [5], RO-PUFs can be used to implement
challenge-response authentication protocols. In the original
RO-PUF, such as the one shown in Figure 2, the multiplexer
selector bits that define which ring oscillators should be paired
together are used as challenge bits, i.e. they are set by the sys-
tem with which the PUF-enabled device communicates, which
knows what output it should expect from the cryptographic
device. The response to the challenge is defined by the device
based on the frequency comparison of the two selected ROs,
and checked against tables of expected responses.
For a traditional RO-PUF composed of R ring oscillators,
the maximum number of challenges is given by R(R−1)2 , which
corresponds to the number of possible ring oscillator pairs.
With our RO-PUF, shown in Figure 2, the challenge bits can
be set not only by changing the selectors of the multiplexers,
but also by setting the voltage configuration of the PUF, i.e.
the supply voltage of every column of inverters. The maximum
number of challenge/response pairs is increased to
R(R− 1)
2
× LC
where R is number of ring oscillators, C is the number of
columns and L is the number of supply voltages.
As pointed out in [5], for the original RO-PUF not all chal-
lenges are valid: if, for example, ROA is faster than ROB and
ROB is faster than ROC , then ROA is necessarily faster than
ROC . The result from the challenge selecting ring oscillators
ROA and ROC is predictable if the responses to the other two
challenges are known and does not constitute a valid challenge.
Also, as discussed in [5], RO-PUF circuits are sensitive to
temperature variations: under certain challenges, the output
bit of the PUF may flip depending on the temperature. Only
challenges that do not exhibit this behaviour are valid.
Similarly, in our RO-PUF not all challenges will be valid.
Two voltage configurations which are very near to each other
(with only a very limited number of supply voltages changing
between the two) have a high probability to result in the same
output bit. We leave a precise determination of the number of
valid challenge-response pairs to future works. In this paper,
we compare our RO-PUF with the original RO-PUF only in
terms of total number of challenge-response pairs, without
considering the impact of the invalid pairs.
VII. AREA CONSIDERATIONS
Many systems using cryptographic algorithms such as hard-
ware authentication devices (RFID tags, etc.), smartcards, and
wireless networks (Bluetooth, NFC, tags, etc.) are character-
ized by very tight power and area budgets. One of the main
advantages of our RO-PUF is its ability to produce the same
number of bits than the original RO-PUF [5] using a smaller
hardware.
In the original RO-PUF, the maximum number of bits
produced by the PUF can be increased only by adding more
ring oscillators to the PUF (see Figure 6-B). Since the structure
of a RO-PUF is simple, the ring oscillators make up most of
the RO-PUF area, and increasing the number of ring oscillators
easily increases its total area.
With our RO-PUF, the maximum number of bits depends
not only to number of ring oscillators but also on the number
of columns and supply voltages. Increasing each of these three
elements increases the number of bits produced by the PUF.
From Figure 6, it is obvious that increasing the number of
columns instead of the number of ring oscillators is a more
effective way to increase the output bits of the PUF.
By increasing the number of columns in each PUF without
adding to the number of ring oscillators, we achieve the same
improvement in the number of bits that can be generated by
a traditional RO-PUF, but with a smaller hardware.
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Fig. 7. Area (left) and maximum number of output bits per unit of area
(right) for a series of our RO-PUFs with L = 3, 2 ≤ R ≤ 30, number of
inverters per RO between 3 and 19 (odd values only) and C equal to the
number of inverters per RO.
Figure 7-left shows the area in terms of gate count for a set
of UMC 90 nm RO-PUFs with different number of ROs and
columns.
Brought to the extreme, this leads to what is to our best
knowledge the most compact RO-PUF suggested in litera-
ture: as shown in Figure 8 the RO-PUF is made of only
two ring oscillators which act as a pair, and there are no
multiplexers. Table I reports implementation details of the RO-
PUF in Figure 8 implemented in UMC 90 nm technology.
Different values of L and C are considered. The number of
inverters is kept equal to C (one inverter per column per
ring oscillator). Three values of L and C are chosen to have
LC > 222, LC > 280 and LC > 2160. Frequency results
represent the oscillating frequency of the ring oscillators under
typical supply voltage conditions obtained from Cadence RTL
Compiler; power results are estimated as a combination of
dynamic and leakage power with a typical supply voltage, at
160MHz clock frequency. The areas of the power switches
are not considered in Table I.
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Fig. 8. A low-area RO-PUF circuit.
The area overhead of the PMOS power switches is the
only overhead which is added to the original RO-PUF. The
percentage of this overhead on the original RO-PUF is shown
in Figure 9. The highest overhead (42%) is for a PUF with
only 1 pair of ring oscillators, 19 inverters per RO and C = 19.
However, this RO-PUF has a much lower area compared to
the original RO-PUF which produces the same number of bits
(see Figure 7).
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Fig. 9. Area overheads of the supply voltage switches. Each PMOS switch
is assumed to consume 0.5GEs.
VIII. TEMPERATURE-RESISTANT RO-PUF
All electronic components are sensitive to variations of their
operating conditions. For a RO-PUF, this sensitivity can cause
uncertainty in the output bits (low reliability). All PUF circuits
should be modelled and tested extensively before a PUF is
commercially deployed, to guarantee high reliability, i.e. that
the cryptographic key or the unique identifier derived from
them is exactly the same under all circumstances.
Temperature is one of the main operating conditions that
can impact reliability [14]: increasing or decreasing the tem-
perature of a RO-PUF can make some of its output bits flip
due to the unequal effect of temperature variations on the
two ring oscillators that are being compared. Recently, several
temperature-aware RO-PUFs have been suggested in literature.
In [9], the authors suggest to introduce a temperature sensor
in every chip. After a chip containing the PUF has been man-
ufactured, it is tested to determine in which temperature range
every pair of ring oscillators is reliable. All ring oscillator pairs
are used only in the intervals in which they are reliable; an
output bit is generated using different pairs depending on the
temperature of the PUF: if the temperature changes, the pair of
ring oscillators generating a bit is changed. A table coupling
temperature ranges with reliable pairs is stored in a memory.
Even if an attacker can gain access to the contents of this
memory, no information about the PUF structure is revealed.
The number of output bits is lower than the total number of
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Fig. 6. Comparison between the maximum number of output bits produced by our PUF (B, D) and the original RO-PUF (A, C). A: original RO-PUF with
11 inverters per RO and 2 ≤ R ≤ 30; B: our RO-PUF with 11 inverters per RO, C = 11, L = 3 and 2 ≤ R ≤ 30; C: original RO-PUF with R = 20 and
number of inverters per RO between 3 and 19 (odd values only); D: our RO-PUF with R = 20, L = 3, number of inverters per RO between 3 and 19 (odd
values only) and C equal to the number of inverters per RO.
#Max bits 222 280 2160
L 2 3 4 2 3 4 2 3 4
C 23 15 11 81 51 41 161 101 81
Area (µm2) 289 241 223 625 463 397 1117 763 637
Freq ( MHz) 1141 1712 2107 344.8 516.9 652.3 169.2 266.0 344.8
Power (µW ) 81.1 60.1 52.3 233.1 157.2 128.4 451.1 288.4 233.3
TABLE I
AREA, FREQUENCY AND POWER FIGURES OF THE PUF IN FIGURE 8 FOR DIFFERENT VALUES OF C AND L (ONE INVERTER PER COLUMN PER RING
OSCILLATOR).
ring oscillator pairs; a hardware utilization of in average 80%
can be achieved by this design compared to the original PUF.
The work in [10] is based on the idea that the effects
of temperature changes on ring oscillator frequencies can be
partially compensated by changing the supply voltage of a
PUF. The authors define and store in memory a table which
matches each temperature to a corresponding supply voltage.
During operation, the temperature is estimated by an on-chip
temperature sensor and the supply voltage of the PUF is
changed accordingly. The information related to the opera-
tional temperatures and the corresponding supply voltages are
saved on an on-chip memory. Attacking this memory does
not reveal any useful information to the attacker. This work
increases reliability but does not guarantee that all pairs of
ring oscillators will result in a reliable output bit: some pairs
of ring oscillators will still need to be eliminated for the sake
of reliability.
With some changes, our multi-level RO-PUF can be trans-
formed into a temperature-aware RO-PUF that can cope with
temperature variations. The main idea is that when a pair of
ring oscillators is selected, the voltage configuration of the
ring oscillators is chosen so that the pair of ROs is guaranteed
to work reliably across the whole temperature range.
The hardware architecture of our temperature-resistant PUF
is shown in Figure 10. Just as for the original RO-PUF, our
temperature-aware RO-PUF provides a maximal number of
challenge/response pairs equal to R(R−1)2 , i.e. the challenge
consists in selecting a pair of ring oscillators and the response
is determined by comparing their oscillating frequencies. In
our design, when a pair is selected, a voltage configuration
is read from a memory and used to supply the inverters
composing the selected ring oscillators. each pair is associated
to a voltage configuration that guarantees reliable operation
of the pair across the whole temperature range. Reliable
configurations for each pair are pre-computed during the post-
manufacturing testing of the PUF and stored in the memory.
As shown in Table II, for a UMC 90 nm PUF with
L = 2, C = 3, each pair of ring oscillators can operate with
LC = 8 different voltage configurations. While some them
are unreliable, some of these configurations will guarantee
reliable operation across the whole temperature range from
−25◦ to 125◦. It is most probable to find for each pair at least
one voltage configuration out of LC cases that is resistant
to temperature variations across the whole temperature range.
For example, as shown in Table II, for a given pair ...
configurations among 8 are resistant to temperature variations.
We tested this assumption for 100 pairs of ring oscillators; for
each pair, we were able to find at least one case showing
resistance to temperature variations.
A memory should put in correspondence each ring oscillator
pair with a voltage configuration (see Table III). With a basic
implementation, the size of the memory in terms of bits can
be estimated by:
MEMbits =
⌈
logL2
⌉
× C × R× (R− 1)
2
where L is the number of supply voltages, C is the number
of columns and R is number of ring oscillators. As an example,
for a PUF with C = 5, L = 2 and R = 4, the size of this
memory will be 30 bits. It would be possible to introduce
a controller and obtain memory savings exploiting the fact
that the majority of the ring oscillator pairs is normally not
temperature-sensitive and can operate reliably using the typical
voltage configuration, but this requires further investigation
and is outside the scope of this paper.
Since the entries are saved in a memory, they are potentially
vulnerable to invasive and semi-invasive attacks. However,
v1v2v3 000 001 010 011 100 101 110 111
temp. t1 t2 t3 t1 t2 t3 t1 t2 t3 t1 t2 t3 t1 t2 t3 t1 t2 t3 t1 t2 t3 t1 t2 t3
PUF 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 1
TABLE II
ONE PAIR OF RING OSCILLATORS WITH L = 2 AND C = 3 CAN OPERATE UNDER LC = 8 VOLTAGE CONFIGURATIONS. THE EFFECT OF TEMPERATURE
VARIATIONS FROM −25◦ TO 125◦ FOR ALL THESE 8 CONFIGURATIONS ARE SHOWN.
pairs 1,2 1,3 1,4 2,3 2,4 3,4
conf. 01001 01100 10010 01110 11000 00110
TABLE III
SAMPLE MEMORY USED IN A TEMPERATURE-AWARE IMPLEMENTATION OF
A RO-PUF WITH L = 2, C = 5 AND R = 4. 1,2 MEANS THE PAIR
BETWEEN RO1 AND RO2.
revealing the information in the memory does not give any
extra information regarding the frequency of the two ROs in
a pair and the RO-PUF has the same security as the solutions
presented in [9] and [10].
Compared to [9], the memory is smaller in our design and a
100% hardware utilization is obtained (each RO pair generates
one output bit). Moreover, compared to both [9] and [10],
our solution does not require the presence of any temperature
sensor.
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Fig. 10. Temperature-aware RO-PUF.
IX. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORKS
In conclusion, our RO-PUF can support a high number
of challenge/response pairs without impacting excessively
the area of the PUF. It can also be used to implement a
temperature-aware RO-PUF with a 100% hardware utilization.
Issues that remain open and left to future work are a
calculation of the number of valid challenge/response pairs
and an efficient implementation of the temperature-aware RO-
PUF. Also, the impact of supply voltage variations should
investigated further.
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